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clination to possess or "unite with" a pleasing object, or an inclination to flee or repel an unpleasing one. It is the latter class whose physiological origin is the more obvious (Th. VIII.). Again they may be divided into those passions which are stimulated by a "strong impression of external things" and those which take their rise in the habitual inclination of the mind towards certain objects (Th. IX.). I have not found in Reich's dissertation any statement of the identity of these two divisions, that is a statement of whether the "approaching" emotions are the internally aroused and the "withdrawal" emotions are the externally aroused, or whether there is no connection at all. One looks for some such statement since the theorems just summarized are followed by one which says that the internally aroused emotions are the remote and mediate causes of disease, whereas the externally aroused are immediate and proximate (Th. V.). There is no need for a second observation on Reich's consistency.

Be that as it may, the attitude of the soul towards its objects determines certain motor effects, such as flight, approach, attack.<sup>2</sup> These motor effects themselves seem to be of two general kinds. "Either the soul extends the radii of its influence . . . from the center to the periphery, whereupon the movement becomes greater, or draws them in from the circumference towards the center, whereupon the movement is diminished or destroyed for the time being" (Th. XVI.).

GEORGE BOAS.

NEW YORK.

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## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1918-1919.* New Series, Vol. XIX. London: Williams and Norgate. 1919. Pp. 311.

This volume of the Proceedings is smaller than in the years immediately prior, because the symposia, which beginning with the volume previous to this were printed also separately, are in the case of this present volume printed only separately. So the Proceedings of 1918-19 are thus in two volumes, of which only one is the subject of the present review.

The general impression of these papers, despite their diversity of titles, is, to the present reviewer at least, one of similarity of mood and character, hard to specify, yet felt through all the differences. They are, more than in previous years, tentative, suggestive, incomplete. Paper after paper seems striving towards something that is

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Aristotle's *De Anima*, Bk. III., Ch. VII., 431a.



glimpsed, yet never quite attained. The idealists are critical of idealism; the realists, of realism; the Bergsonian complains we are isolated units save where matter unites us; and the pessimistic theologian rebukes those who hope for personal immortality. Almost every contributor seems to be approaching, each in his own peculiar way, one subject: "What are we to make of the curious fact that there are many minds, and what do these many minds do when they severally think about the world, and what may their future be?"

If the best in this volume only rarely reaches up to the level of the best in the year just preceding, the average level is even higher. One paper, Dean Inge's characterization of Platonism, full of astonishing phrases that linger in one's memory, rises at the close to a height scarcely attained elsewhere in either volume. Among the other papers here, the reviewer is perhaps making invidious distinctions if he specially recommends John Laird's and J. B. Baillie's keen and constructive criticisms of certain types of idealistic argument, and the interesting angle from which A. E. Heath surveys "the scope of the scientific method." But this is to discriminate against others almost equally good: the able effort of A. F. Shand to link up value-theory with his own profound analysis of the emotions; or C. D. Broad's critique of the mechanical and the teleological, which adds one more to the series of acute studies of special problems which he has recently been giving us, each handled with a sanity and originality most refreshing and attractive. It must be said of this last paper that, for once, Mr. Broad's scientific apparatus seems unnecessarily cumbersome and pretentious for the result achieved, but the closing pages are eminently worth while.

If we have so far left unmentioned the Presidential Address by G. E. Moore, it was that it might serve as a text for a special discourse. The address stands in remarkable contrast with the notable paper by Bertrand Russell, which opens the above-mentioned symposium volume. They represent, apparently, two tendencies already latent in an unstable compound we were calling, a while back, by the name New Realism. Since those happy days of innocence and epistemological monism, when things called selves knew directly other things physical, called tables and brickbats, and knew also things mathematical, such as two and three, and liked the latter rather better, but granted them all an equal reality,—since those happy days, Mr. Russell has come far. Some parts of him have, it would seem, come faster than others, so that pieces of him may still be caught lingering at various points along the road. But as the "real Mr. Russell" has been found to be only an artificial construct, we should not, perhaps, be too much shocked by this disintegration.



Meanwhile Mr. Moore has stayed at home; but owing to the fact that he has employed his time in picking the family mansion to pieces, he is now almost as much "abroad" as Mr. Russell.

Mr. Russell has been through a wide orbit, traversing a region somewhere between Berkeley and Leibniz. You looked for him in the same quarter of the heavens where you looked for the idealists; only you did not dare to call him that, for Mr. Russell long ago committed himself, in print, to the opinion that idealists are a contemptible lot, and Mr. Russell never changes his moral judgments, for they are subjective, and therefore within his control. So when he flashed upon a novel thought, the thought that all that is, is idea, he did not use any such tainted language to express it; but told us, instead, that all that is, is "a six-dimensional manifold of perspectives of sensibilia." A physical thing is the sum of its appearances in the various perspectives, only in certain cases nobody is there to see a number of these appearances. Indeed, Mr. Russell seems to have recently discovered that in no case is anybody there to see. That a thing is to be considered as nothing but the sum of its appearances, is what Mr. Moore, in the volume we are here reviewing, denominates the Mill-Russell theory of objects. The ordinary notion of object is wrong, according to Mr. Russell, because when two people look at the same object, what one sees is not what the other sees, therefore there is no same object. Hence each experiencer is, at any moment, living in a world all his private own, his own momentary perspective. But how did the two people ever find this out? How did they even ever suppose they were looking at the same object, if they are thus shut within themselves? Mr. Russell's premise says they looked at the same object and thus discovered an interesting discrepancy. From this, Mr. Russell draws the conclusion that his premise is not true. Had Mr. Russell, in the old days, found, in an idealist book, anything like this conclusion that destroys its own premise, he would have hailed with delight such a self-refutation of idealism. Meanwhile Mr. Russell might have been forgiven the way he arrives at the Mill-Russell theory, if only he had used it as a scientist would use an hypothesis, working it for all it was worth, deducing with precision all its consequences. But it must be confessed that, so far, we have had from him, concerning perspectives and Mill-Russell objects, only some confusedly intuitionist and cavalierly unscientific expositions, plus a promise that some day Mr. A. N. Whitehead will supply us with precise details.

But Mr. Russell's orbit has now swept him along into a new region. He has become a behaviorist. He has dropped the epistemological subject. He dallies with William James's theory, that the



mental and the physical are two different ways in which the same things are put together. He has adopted almost everything we had been accustomed to associate with American New Realism. Whether the cometary tail of his theory of perspectives, which he still pulls along behind him, will survive in this new atmosphere, remains to be seen. For behaviorism has meant, to those who held it hitherto, the right to start with a common world, a common world which, in some sense, endures through time, and in which we all move about. The structure of this common world is not reducible to its qualities, and it is by means of the structure that we come to compare qualities. You and I may disagree as to whether the house-door is red or yellow. But I know we are discussing the same door, for you use it to enter the house the same as I, and do not attempt to walk through the blank wall. Mr. Russell would probably characterize these remarks as rather crude; but he long ago said, and wisely, that in such matters the crude view is often nearest right. But in any case the fact remains, that American realists have clung to behaviorism, even to the brink of a radical materialism, precisely because they felt it to be the road of objectivism, the road away from Berkeley and from Leibniz. We await with interest Mr. Russell's future synthesis of incompatibles.

While Mr. Russell has thus been exploiting the idealist and subjectivist tendency in epistemological monism, Mr. Moore has been leaning the other way; with the consequence that now he seems about to topple over into epistemological dualism, much to his own disgust; so that the paper before us is composed of a series of violent contortions performed on the ragged edge, wherein Mr. Moore is trying desperately to keep his balance and not fall over the line.

Mr. Moore is seriously worried over what it is I see when I see an inkstand. What surprises us in Mr. Moore, is that he here shows himself alarmed by those same old bogies which we had supposed all new realists, as part of their initiation into the arcana of the sect, had long since unmasked and exorcized. What I see, as the inkstand, looks different when I put on blue glasses; therefore what I see can not be part of the inkstand. Now surely, in so far as we can clearly distinguish thus between the inkstand that is, and the inkstand that appears,—surely there is, so far, no reason for denying we know the inkstand that is. The possibility of making the distinction is also the possibility of rising above it. The trouble is that a next move is then introduced, to the effect that both cases are merely two cases of the inkstand that appears, and some inkstand that really is, lies yonder beyond and unreachable. But if there is to be any such second move, it ought rather to be a criticism of the



inkstand that appears, a criticism which points out that this inkstand has as much right,—not as little right,—to be called the real inkstand as has the other. If it looks blue under certain circumstances, then it is the real inkstand that looks blue,—there is only one inkstand involved. Indeed you must say that under these circumstances it simply is blue. The phrase “looks blue” merely calls our attention to the fact that there are peculiar circumstances. There is no more puzzle about the real inkstand being both blue and not blue, the one in one context, the other in another, than there is in the same piece of gold leaf being yellow in reflected light and green in transmitted light, though the place where I see the yellow and where I see the green is one and the same place. So also, the same inkstand is moving or not moving, according as you choose your axes of reference; heavy or light, according as you consider its potential gravitational acceleration towards the earth or towards the moon. We deal in each and all these cases with physical effects of physical causes; there is no need for, and no meaning in, lugging into the discussion any references to any realm of the subjective or the mental.

But perhaps Mr. Moore would still feel that this was not meeting his difficulty. He might even suspect that we were thus merely coming to the Mill-Russell theory from another angle. We are calling the little blue something in one set of circumstances the same thing as the big white something in another set. It is like the jack-knife that was still the same old knife after it had had new blades substituted for the old ones, and also a new handle. What do we mean by “the same”? Or again, the scientist tells us that this same solid inkstand is about as “full of empty space” as is the starry sky, lonely electrons wandering afar from one another. Once more, what in this sameness in things so different? There would seem to be no way of avoiding the conclusion that “the same with” means “standing in a specific relation to,” and that the “thing” of naïve realism must be dissolved into a relational system. In so far, the Mill-Russell theory is right.

Where the Mill-Russell theory turns the situation upside down, is when it assumes the elements of the relational system are given data, to be identified with the various “appearances of the thing,” but the system itself is constructed by us, so that a perspective is simpler than the common world, which common world is made out of perspectives. Surely this is to reverse the logical priority. An appearance of something, such as how the inkstand just now looks to me, is one of the most complex parts of the total thing-system, being the composite resultant, the summed effects, of a most complicated



tangle of causes. Its apparent simplicity vanishes the instant you try to make it a starting-point for inference. It is therefore exceedingly undesirable that we begin with such a given block datum as the center of our theory of a thing-system. No analysis can break up such a datum into suitable elements by direct attack; no inference can be safely based on it as a unit.

Perhaps an analogy will bring out the character of the situation. The given datum of astronomy is the easily observed circular movement of the heavens. Building on this datum, we should naturally arrive, almost at a single bound, at something like the Ptolemaic astronomy. And of course Ptolemaic astronomy is theoretically possible: you can take the earth as the center, and any orbit of any heavenly body can be mathematically resolved into a system of circular motions relative to this center. And we may grant the Russell theory of perspectives exactly the same type of theoretical possibility. But Copernican astronomy, in this respect quite contrary to Ptolemaic, runs violently in the face of what seems the very evidence of the senses. It declares the motions of the stars are not simply what they seem to be, but the appearance of the heavens to the observer on the earth must be interpreted as the resultant of a great complex of factors. Yet the Copernican astronomy has prevailed. It has prevailed because of a certain objective simplicity; while the snarl of Ptolemaic epicycle on epicycle made that astronomy utterly unmanageable.

Mr. Russell, in his theory of perspectives, would start, like Ptolemaic astronomy, with the given mass-impression. He is at one with the traditions of British empiricism in clinging to the given datum; logician though he is, he fears to venture forth into any sea of speculation where thought is one's compass and guide. The real is the verified and the verified is always quality given, hard, stubborn, uncontaminated. So he would take a now given, unanalyzed, three-dimensional appearance, and put it along with other similar, and supposedly somewhere given appearances, to form a three- or four-dimensional manifold, which has three-dimensional manifolds for elements. He would thus try to arrive at a common world by construction. He pursues this cumbersome method because he wants to start from, and keep close to, what is indubitably given. Genetic psychology insinuates a doubt as to the immediacy with which any one perspective is given as ordered in three dimensions, but he puts such suggestions aside as illegitimate, for this might knock out the only solid starting-point he has,—and then where would he be? But even though we grant to his method a certain sort of theoretical possibility; we must insist that its claim to superior certainty is unjustified. At the first move it makes, it has already transcended the



given, and possibly transcended it in a way as rash as the first inference of the naïve spectator beholding the march of the stars, who jumps to the conclusion, almost forced on him by his senses themselves, that obviously he is the center around which the universe revolves. Mr. Russell seems to forget that what is near to the indubitable may be exceedingly dubious.

It is more desirable that we start with assuming the common world, and explain, for instance, the appearance of the inkstand, as due, one factor in it to one set of causes, another factor in it to another set of causes. We thus build up the given datum, and not the world. We arrive at the given at the end of our thought-process, and do not begin with it. Of course, as always happens when we start with what are in the order of knowledge hypotheses no one given datum can ever be a complete verification of our theory. But what we, in the order of knowledge, are feeling after by hypotheses, is, in the order of nature, not hypothesis nor knowledge, but the common world itself. And we may fairly assume that science brings us into the closest contact we have with that world. And so we feel justified in taking the inkstand as it is *thought of* by science, not as being more nor less real than any of the ways it appears to the senses, but as being more properly the suitable center and starting-point, the key-position, from which to grasp the structure of that system which we call "one thing." We feel justified in starting this with the common-world. Why? Because it is more probable, from the standpoint of any really sound logic, that a common-world exists, and that the other minds are thinking therein, than it is that I saw a blue inkstand half a minute ago, or see one ten feet away from me now,—and Mr. Russell in his heart of hearts knows that this is so.

H. T. COSTELLO.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

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## JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. July-August, 1919. *Correspondance inédite de A. Spir. Lettres à A. Penjon* (pp. 425-441): A. SPIR.—These letters contain comments explanatory of certain points in Spir's idealistic metaphysics. The ideality of time, the status of the finite self, and the relation of the Absolute to our knowledge are among the topics discussed. *L'idée du néant et le problème de l'origine radicale dans le néoplatonisme grec* (pp. 443-475): E. BREHIER.—The "negative theology" of Neo-Platonism is significant not only because of its discovery that Reality is ultimately indescribable, but also as an attempt to deal with the